PE Goes Hollywood

I thought I would reproduce here my reply to a post on a actors’ union bulletin board regarding the role of private equity funds in the EMI world:

Private equity funds, of course, argue that they are “efficient” because they funnel investors’ money into areas where they have special expertise. And when they do so they often take control of a particular company or even an entire industry and thus close the gap between public shareholders and inside managers. So, for example, at one point KKR, a leading buyout fund, owned approximately 40% of the US grocery industry. They certainly had some expertise in that arena and likely increased profitability. But their methods of doing so included laying off workers, closing down many stores, disrupting communities and lives of thousands. The late 1980s buyout of Safeway by KKR was a particularly harsh example. The southern California grocery strike of a few years ago was, in part, a symptom of that buyout as KKR was still on the board of Safeway at the time.

In general the concern that labor unions and their representatives on pension funds are raising about PE is that this strategy relies heavily on the use of borrowed money to take over companies. When you finance a company with debt rather than equity it decreases the flexibility available to management and puts pressure on the company to make regular interest payments on the debt. And there is always the lurking risk of forcing the company into bankruptcy where a federal judge can break union contracts and reduce pension and health care benefits. That is the concern many have about the Chrysler buyout by Cerberus.

The role of PE in film and entertainment is slightly different. For the time being PE is being used as a means of shifting slightly away from traditional bank lending. As readers here know better than me, films are increasingly capital intensive operations – they require a heavy up front commitment to produce and to distribute with lots of risk and uncertainty about eventual box office success. Only a few films become reliable franchises (like the Bond films or Pirates) that can be counted upon to generate predictable revenues for investors. So the studios and producers have often relied on specialized lenders at particular investment banks and commercial banks for funding.

But in the past few years that structure is shifting. My view is that globalization is hitting the entertainment and media sectors in a major way now. The opportunities that new distribution technologies could generate are enormous. I met recently with a company here in Silicon Valley called Vudu Labs. They have a proprietary system that relies on peer-to-peer technology to distribute films in real time directly to the TV without going through the cable pay per view system or the internet. They have a distribution deal in place now with seven studios and a film library of more than 5000 films – far more than Apple (something I discovered when I bought a video iPod recently, much to my dismay!)

As these new digital distribution systems get put in place the potential for new global revenues skyrockets. The global audience could grow by billions according to Michael Eisner. When those kinds of numbers get thrown around Wall Street listens. So bankers and the studios, as well as agencies like Endeavor among others, are forming new investment funds to funnel money into the industry. These are already large – in the hundreds of millions – but could easily grow larger. I think the emergence of these types of funds changes the politics of the industry and shifts power to those who control distribution and finance rather than production. (A similar shift is underway in other industries.) Since much of the effort of the guilds in collective bargaining has been focused on production (divvying up the 20% of revenues left after the distribution arms have taken their 80% cut) the risk is that the new forces in finance, distribution and the super-agencies leave the guilds out in the cold once again as they did with DVDs.

Finally, a note on regulation: yes, the PUHCA regulated the energy industry until it was gutted by a weak Congress bought out by energy industry Enron era lobbyists. The result is a wave of mergers and acquisitions underway in that sector that could result in layoffs and problems in the power delivery system. It turns out that there is still on the books now a New Deal era law, the Investment Company Act of 1940, that is supposed to regulate PE funds. But Congress created some exemptions in the Clinton era to allow buyout funds to escape control of the Act. The AFL-CIO recently sent the SEC and Congress a letter calling for the use of the Act to regulate PE funds – in particular, to be used to regulate the Blackstone Group which is attempting a public offering. I worked with the AFL on the letter and I think this effort is making some headway now in Congress as a new bill has been introduced to eliminate the tax loopholes that PE funds rely on.

PetroChina Syndrome Hits Fidelity

A big victory for the PetroChina campaign today as mutual fund giant Fidelity has cut its stake in the company. The AFL-CIO and others warned of the downside of investing in PetroChina when it first went public in 2000. I wrote a law journal article on the implications of that campaign and the IPO which you can access here: The PetroChina Syndrome

Fidelity Investments Cuts Stake In PetroChina on Darfur Concerns – WSJ.com

Fidelity Investments Cuts Stake In PetroChina on Darfur Concerns – WSJ.com

A big victory for the PetroChina campaign today as mutual fund giant Fidelity has cut its stake in the company. The AFL-CIO and others warned of the downside of investing in PetroChina when it first went public in 2000. I wrote a law journal article on the implications of that campaign and the IPO which you can access here

The PetroChina Syndrome

Fidelity Investments Cuts Stake In PetroChina on Darfur Concerns – WSJ.com

AFL-CIO intervenes in Blackstone IPO

The AFL-CIO is stepping into the ongoing fray over the role of private equity with a letter to the SEC as reported here: FT.com Union in move to halt Blackstone IPO. This is perfect timing in light of the announcement recently of the takeover of Chrysler – a company with thousands of unionized workers – by Cerberus, a private equity firm. Also, today in Congress hearings are being held on the impact of private equity on workers.

The AFL-CIO letter according to the Financial Times makes the important point that when a private equity firm goes public it should obey the requirements of the Investment Company Act of 1940, widely known as the 40 Act. The 40 Act is a firewall to protect investors against the potential misuse of their investment and a firewall against the growth of speculative financial interests as opposed to the real economy.

Congress understood that the first two securities laws they passed in the 1930s – 1933 and 1934 Acts were insufficient protection against investment pools and after an exhaustive four year study put in place the Investment Company Act. While the 33/34 Acts protected investors from potential abuse by corporate managers and financial intermediaries like broker/dealers, these statutes were not sufficient to protect investors from organizers of investment pools such as those put together by mutual fund companies or buyout funds.

Such pools pose particular problems because they say to the investing public: “trust me” to take your money and invest it wherever we want. Thus the 40 Act requires specialized governance mechanisms for investment companies. While mutual funds are the classic and best understood investment company, “special situation” companies like buyout funds have always been considered investment companies. Special situation companies have, until now, always functioned as either private investment companies or relied solely on investments from qualified purchasers.

The Blackstone IPO attempts to circumvent the governance protections that the 40 Act mandates even though it is no longer to be a private investment company. As one example, under the 40 Act the fund must have independent directors who represent the interests of public investors but that will not be the case if Blackstone gets its way. Congress and the SEC must understand that the substance of Blackstone pre and post IPO is to function as a special situation investment company that earns its income through its investment in target companies.

As the SEC itself found in Bankers Securities Corporation 15 SEC 1695: “In the course of its history applicant has obtained large and controlling interests in various businesses, disposed of some, and retained others. Its officers have actively managed controlled businesses for the purpose of rehabilitating important investments in the portfolio. This is a well-recognized form of investment company business, known as dealing in ‘special situations.’… Not only does this record fall short of sustaining applicant’s claim that it is primarily engaged in non-investment company business, but it demonstrates affirmatively that Bankers Securities Corporation was organized, and has always been operated, as an investment enterprise. Public investment in the company was invited and has been maintained on representations which meant, in essence, that the company was diversifying stockholders’ risk by a varied investment program. Stockholders were not asked to rely on the skill of applicant’s management in the merchandising, or in any other specific mercantile or commercial business. They were given to understand that the management was alert always to find profitable repositories of invested funds, and the history of the company bears out the understanding, created in stockholders, that the company was not committing itself primarily to any specific business.”

Blackstone attempts to escape the obvious conclusion that it is and has always been an investment company by interpolating two new layers in its corporate structure – Blackstone Holdings and Blackstone LP – and then selling units in Blackstone LP to the public. But as the prospectus makes abundantly clear investors are being told they will share in the rewards and bear the risks of Blackstone’s (special situations) investment activity. This conclusion is reinforced by the importance of the 20% carried interest as a significant source of potential gain for investors.

A fundamental principle of US securities law is that substance – economic reality – trumps form. This is essential to enable regulators to stay ahead of the myriad ways that speculators will attempt to separate people from their money. The principle that substance trumps form is essential because the securities laws, including the 40 Act, are remedial in nature – their purpose is to protect investors and to act as a firewall between the real economy and financial speculators. Congress intended that the SEC not ignore the purpose of an investment scheme even if it appears formally to comply with securities regulation if a fundamental goal of the act is at stake.

In the Blackstone IPO which is reportedly now to be followed by an offering by Carlyle Group a fundamental goal – protection of the investing public from the potential risks of investment pools – is at stake. When a financial speculator like Blackstone seeks to raise capital in the public markets – to dip into what Justice Brandeis called “other people’s money” – it must meet the requirements laid out in the 40 Act or it must continue to operate as a private company.

AFL-CIO intervenes in Blackstone IPO

The AFL-CIO is stepping into the ongoing fray over the role of private equity with a letter to the SEC as reported here: FT.com Union in move to halt Blackstone IPO. This is perfect timing in light of the announcement recently of the takeover of Chrysler – a company with thousands of unionized workers – by Cerberus, a private equity firm. Also, today in Congress hearings are being held on the impact of private equity on workers.

The AFL-CIO letter according to the Financial Times makes the important point that when a private equity firm goes public it should obey the requirements of the Investment Company Act of 1940, widely known as the 40 Act. The 40 Act is a firewall to protect investors against the potential misuse of their investment and a firewall against the growth of speculative financial interests as opposed to the real economy.

Congress understood that the first two securities laws they passed in the 1930s – 1933 and 1934 Acts were insufficient protection against investment pools and after an exhaustive four year study put in place the Investment Company Act. While the 33/34 Acts protected investors from potential abuse by corporate managers and financial intermediaries like broker/dealers, these statutes were not sufficient to protect investors from organizers of investment pools such as those put together by mutual fund companies or buyout funds.

Such pools pose particular problems because they say to the investing public: “trust me” to take your money and invest it wherever we want. Thus the 40 Act requires specialized governance mechanisms for investment companies. While mutual funds are the classic and best understood investment company, “special situation” companies like buyout funds have always been considered investment companies. Special situation companies have, until now, always functioned as either private investment companies or relied solely on investments from qualified purchasers.

The Blackstone IPO attempts to circumvent the governance protections that the 40 Act mandates even though it is no longer to be a private investment company. As one example, under the 40 Act the fund must have independent directors who represent the interests of public investors but that will not be the case if Blackstone gets its way. Congress and the SEC must understand that the substance of Blackstone pre and post IPO is to function as a special situation investment company that earns its income through its investment in target companies.

As the SEC itself found in Bankers Securities Corporation 15 SEC 1695: “In the course of its history applicant has obtained large and controlling interests in various businesses, disposed of some, and retained others. Its officers have actively managed controlled businesses for the purpose of rehabilitating important investments in the portfolio. This is a well-recognized form of investment company business, known as dealing in ‘special situations.’… Not only does this record fall short of sustaining applicant’s claim that it is primarily engaged in non-investment company business, but it demonstrates affirmatively that Bankers Securities Corporation was organized, and has always been operated, as an investment enterprise. Public investment in the company was invited and has been maintained on representations which meant, in essence, that the company was diversifying stockholders’ risk by a varied investment program. Stockholders were not asked to rely on the skill of applicant’s management in the merchandising, or in any other specific mercantile or commercial business. They were given to understand that the management was alert always to find profitable repositories of invested funds, and the history of the company bears out the understanding, created in stockholders, that the company was not committing itself primarily to any specific business.”

Blackstone attempts to escape the obvious conclusion that it is and has always been an investment company by interpolating two new layers in its corporate structure – Blackstone Holdings and Blackstone LP – and then selling units in Blackstone LP to the public. But as the prospectus makes abundantly clear investors are being told they will share in the rewards and bear the risks of Blackstone’s (special situations) investment activity.
This conclusion is reinforced by the importance of the 20% carried interest as a significant source of potential gain for investors.

A fundamental principle of US securities law is that substance – economic reality – trumps form. This is essential to enable regulators to stay ahead of the myriad ways that speculators will attempt to separate people from their money. The principle that substance trumps form is essential because the securities laws, including the 40 Act, are remedial in nature – their purpose is to protect investors and to act as a firewall between the real economy and financial speculators. Congress intended that the SEC not ignore the purpose of an investment scheme even if it appears formally to comply with securities regulation if a fundamental goal of the act is at stake.

In the Blackstone IPO which is reportedly now to be followed by an offering by Carlyle Group a fundamental goal – protection of the investing public from the potential risks of investment pools – is at stake. When a financial speculator like Blackstone seeks to raise capital in the public markets – to dip into what Justice Brandeis called “other people’s money” – it must meet the requirements laid out in the 40 Act or it must continue to operate as a private company.